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INTRODUCTION: THE DEMSETZ THESIS AND
THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
Both conventional price theory and standard economic accounts of tort
and contract law assume fixed property rights. In fact, however, property
regimes are not static but change over time. Given the assumption of fixed
property that otherwise prevails in economic literature, explaining the evo-
lution of property rights is one of the great challenges for the economic
analysis of law.
The point of departure for virtually all efforts to explain changes in property
rights is Harold Demsetz’s path-breaking article, “Toward a Theory of Prop-
erty Rights.”1 The article is still widely cited and reproduced, especially in
first-year property courses in law schools. Yet for all its deserved fame, the
article contains at best a sketch of a theory and offers only anecdotal evidence
by way of support. On April 21–22, 2001, the conference The Evolution of
Property Rights was held at Northwestern University School of Law. The
purpose of the conference was to reexamine the Demsetz thesis, consider
possible alternatives or elaborations to it, and develop further empirical ev-
idence either to confirm or disconfirm it. The articles in this volume, including
an afterword by Demsetz, are the outgrowth of the papers presented at that
conference.
The Demsetz thesis can be seen as an anticipation of the idea that the
common law evolves toward efficient rules. Demsetz hypothesized that prop-
erty rights emerge when the social benefits of establishing such rights exceed
their social costs. In effect, he suggested that legal rules regarding resources
change over time along a path that produces net benefits to the relevant
community.
Demsetz broadly described the benefits of creating new types of property
in terms of the internalization of externalities. On closer examination, we
can see that he actually made three distinct arguments about the benefits of
property, each presented in the language of externalities.
First, following Jeremy Bentham, Demsetz noted that property provides
* John Paul Stevens Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc.
347 (1967).
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superior incentives for the development of resources relative to a system in
which access to resources is open to all. Property concentrates the risks and
rewards of investment on designated individuals, thus assuring a correspon-
dence between those who sow and those who reap. Although it is possible
to describe this benefit in the language of externalities—improvements that
would be external benefits to the community under an open-access regime
are fully captured by the owner under a regime of property—this is a some-
what idiosyncratic way to present the argument. (Indeed, this aspect of the
Demsetz article is often confusing to students not well versed in the literature
on externalities.)
Second, Demsetz argued that property eliminates or at least reduces rent
dissipation associated with open-access regimes. If a resource is up for grabs
to the first to capture it (think of a fishery), the result is often premature
consumption and wasteful dissipation of resources in competition to secure
the resource, a phenomenon that was labeled the “tragedy of the commons”
soon after Demsetz wrote.2 By allocating resources to particular owners,
property overcomes these rent dissipation problems by allowing the owner
to determine the optimal timing and degree of consumption. This benefit of
property is more commonly described in the language of externalities: under
a regime of open access, each consumer of resources imposes external costs
on other potential consumers of the resource, whereas with property, this
externality is eliminated.
Third, building on the work of Ronald Coase,3 Demsetz noted that property
reduces the number of parties who must agree on measures to control spillover
effects such as flooding or pollution. Under an open-access regime, all po-
tential users of a resource must agree to control spillovers; with property in
place, only the owner of the resource and those affected by its use need
agree. This insight, which was original to Demsetz, is the one most often
expressed in the language of externalities.
Demsetz hypothesized that property rights emerge when some change in
the relative value of resources occurs that makes it cost-effective to internalize
costs that previously were experienced as externalities, understood in the
broad sense encompassed by the three foregoing arguments. This might be
due, for example, to the introduction of new technology or the opening or
closing of particular markets. Such a change in relative values causes the
benefits or costs of having a property regime in a resource to change. If the
change is sufficient to alter the cost-benefit equation, an alteration in the
nature of property rights will take place.
Demsetz famously illustrated his basic points by describing anthropological
evidence relating to property rights among different Indian tribes. He de-
scribed work by Eleanor Leacock that suggested that property in land existed
2 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
3 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
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among Montagnes Indians in what is now Quebec. He suggested that this
was likely due to the introduction of the fur trade, which increased the value
of beaver pelts and made it cost-effective to devise an institution that would
encourage husbandry of beaver and reduce competitive overhunting. In con-
trast, the tribes of the American Southwest never developed property in land.
Demsetz suggested that this is because the animals hunted by these Indians
ranged over a much wider territory, making the development of property in
land too costly relative to the benefits it would have provided.
As this brief summary suggests, the Demsetz article leaves a number of
important questions unresolved. Demsetz was explicit about the cost-benefit
criterion for change in property rights, offered a sophisticated account of the
benefits of property, and included one compelling illustration of his thesis.
But the article said nothing about the factors that determine the costs of a
property regime. It said virtually nothing about the precise mechanism by
which a society determines that the benefits of property exceed the costs,
other than to disclaim any position on whether this would necessarily entail
a “conscious endeavor.”4 And it said virtually nothing about the form that
emergent property rights are likely to take, other than to observe that whether
a society adopts private property or state-owned property may turn in part
on the “community’s tastes” for collectivism.5 Thus, the Demsetz article
leaves more than ample room for further scholarly development.
One nagging question concerns the domain of the thesis. The article is
about the evolution of “property,” but at different times it offers different
definitions of the institution of property that have different implications for
the scope of the argument.6 To consider only the polar cases: Does the thesis
apply only to rules that establish private exclusion rights in resources, that
is, conventional private property? Or does it apply to any institution that
functions to internalize externalities, which would cover many forms of state
ownership, government regulation, and private contracting as well as con-
ventional property? If the former is the intended domain, then the thesis
would assert that exclusion rights are presumptively efficient but would take
no position on the efficiency of other mechanisms for internalizing exter-
nalities. If the latter is the intended domain, then the thesis would be tan-
tamount to saying that virtually all law tends to evolve in the direction of
promoting efficiency—a kind of public-interest theory of regulation.
A number of contributions to this volume touch on the question of the
domain of the Demsetz thesis. Some contributors, such as Gary Libecap and
4 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.
5 Id.
6 For example, compare id. at 347 (“An owner of property rights possesses the consent of
fellowmen to allow him to act in particular ways”) with id. at 354 (“Private ownership implies
that the community recognizes the right of the owner to exclude others from exercising the
owner’s private rights”). See also id. at 350–51 (describing “rules for liability in automobile
accidents” as a phenomenon illustrating his thesis).
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James Smith and Richard Epstein,7 consider the application of the thesis to
both exclusion rights and government regulation. Others, such as Saul Lev-
more, are more careful to limit the thesis to exclusion rights.8 Henry Smith,
in the most sophisticated treatment of this issue, argues that the basic benefit-
cost framework for overcoming externalities applies both to exclusion rights
and to what he calls governance mechanisms.9 He further argues that the
institution of property, at least in its complex modern incarnation, includes
both types of rights and hence that this broader perspective is warranted.
Ultimately, however, a theory that explains the evolution of property in a
satisfactory fashion must be one that generates predictions that are unique
to property and not one that would equally account for the development of
other institutions, even if they perform overlapping functions. Perhaps the
use of the word “property” is a distraction here, since, as Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman emphasize in their contribution,10 that term is a protean
one of many meanings. So another way to make the point is to say that we
need a theory as to when and why private-exclusion rights emerge, and ideally
this theory would explain the rise and fall of exclusion rights, not the rise
and fall of any and all organized efforts to “internalize externalities.”
Another question concerns the shape of the benefit and cost curves that
Demsetz hypothesized determine the emergence of property. Are the curves
linear, as Terry Anderson and Peter Hill assumed in their well-known re-
statement of the Demsetz thesis?11 Or can one or more of the curves have
a different shape? Are the costs of establishing property independent of the
value of resources, or do increases in value also increase the costs, for
example, by creating greater returns to theft?12 Do the costs of establishing
property include large start-up or “fixed” costs, with lower costs of main-
taining the system thereafter in terms of variable or marginal costs? The
contributions of Douglas Allen and Henry Smith contain the most complete
theoretical discussions of these issues.13 Allen hypothesizes that marginal
cost curves may often be nonlinear and that this will preclude the first-best
use of resources and in some circumstances may frustrate the emergence of
any type of property regime. Smith suggests that exclusion and what he calls
7 Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights
in the United States, in this issue, at S589; Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons:
Parking on Public Roads, in this issue, at S515.
8 Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, in this issue, at S421.
9 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, in this issue, at S453.
10 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, in this issue, at S373.
11 See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J. Law & Econ. 163 (1975).
12 See Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 Kyklos 319 (1989).
13 Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value
of an Asset, in this issue, at S339.
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governance present marginal cost curves with different slopes, which can
explain why we sometimes see shifts from exclusion to governance and back
to exclusion again as resource values rise. Still other contributors, including
Levmore and David Haddock and Lynne Kiesling,14 touch on the possibility
that property regimes entail large start-up costs.
Two contributions shed light on the costs of developing property institu-
tions through empirical studies of situations in which the price of a resource
increases but no shift in property institutions follows. Dean Lueck examines
the case of the American bison,15 which became significantly more valuable
as transcontinental railroads made it cheaper both to hunt bison and to trans-
port robes and hides to market. In contrast to the beaver trade cited by
Demsetz, however, no property rights in bison territory emerged; instead, in
a very short span of time, the bison came close to extinction. Lueck ultimately
concludes that property rights did not emerge because the costs of assembling
and enforcing property rights in live bison herds were prohibitive. Libecap
and James Smith explore the chronic failure of unitization proposals in many
oil and gas fields. They argue that a key problem for unitization is that both
oil and gas are commonly found in the same pool but are owned in different
proportions by different mineral right owners, compounding the information
and transaction costs of reaching a consensual agreement in support of un-
itization. Both studies suggest that the failure of property to emerge can often
be explained once we develop a better understanding of the costs of estab-
lishing a system of property rights.
A third question is whether the Demsetz perspective can tell us anything
about the form that property rights will take when they do emerge. Demsetz
distinguished private property, state property, and communal property, the
last of which he appeared to equate with open access. More recently, com-
mentators have tended to differentiate between communal property, in which
resources are restricted to members of a particular community and are subject
to regulation under community norms or rules, and open access, in which
resources are open to all takers.16 Thus, “property” is now more conven-
tionally divided into the categories of private property, communal property,
and government property, and each is distinguished from an open-access
regime, that is, a true commons. Most of the contributions to this volume
adopt this classificatory scheme.
In his original paper, Demsetz suggested that some societies would tend
to evolve toward state ownership, whereas others would tend to prefer private
ownership, and he attributed this to cultural differences (“community tastes”).
14 David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, in this issue,
at S545.
15 Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, in this issue,
at S609.
16 See, for example, Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990).
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In his contribution to this volume, Demsetz seeks to fill this gap in his prior
study, offering a thoughtful and panoramic account of the factors that he
believes have militated over time in favor of private property rather than
state ownership.17 Other commentators also touch on the question of what
determines the particular form that emergent property takes, with a number
of contributors, including Epstein, Levmore, and Henry Smith, giving con-
sideration to when some type of communal property regime is likely to
emerge rather than a full-blown private-exclusion regime.
A fourth question concerns the mechanism by which a society moves from
a state of open access to property (or vice versa). The original Demsetz article
was an exercise in comparative static analysis, offering before-and-after snap-
shots of a society in which changes in relative resource values give rise to
changes in property institutions. But the actual process that leads from one
state to another was a black box. A number of contributors attempt to pierce
the box and offer more particularized suggestions for how such a transition
takes place. Their suggestions tend to fall into two categories.
By far the most common approach among the contributors is to seek to
illuminate the causation puzzle by injecting distributional considerations into
Demsetz’s simple wealth-maximization model. For example, Anderson and
Hill suggest that property rights emerge because of the entrepreneurial efforts
of individuals who have superior ability (based on either human or natural
resource endowments or both) to capture economic rents from the creation
of property rights.18 Stuart Banner offers a similar idea but couched in less
flattering terms:19 he suggests that property rights emerge when powerful
oligarchs control both the largest share of resources whose value would be
maximized by the creation of property and the political system through which
such a transition is effectuated. Other contributors, including Epstein and
Levmore, draw on interest-group theory as either a supplement or replacement
of the social efficiency explanation offered by Demsetz. Of those who stress
distributional issues, Levmore stakes out the most pessimistic position in
terms of the explanatory potential of the Demsetz thesis, arguing that “for
every transaction-cost story about changed access or other property rights
there is a suspicious—or even pessimistic—interest-group explanation.”20
A second approach to the causation puzzle, which is presented most fully
through an example discussed by Epstein, is that property rights emerge as
a norm widely shared among the members of a close-knit community with
17 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition between Private
and Collective Ownership, in this issue, at S653.
18 Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, in this issue, at S489.
19 Stuart Banner, Transitions between Property Regimes, in this issue, at S359.
20 Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, supra note 8, at S433.
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a strong commonality of interests.21 Epstein’s example concerns the emer-
gence of informal exclusion rights to on-street urban parking places after
major snowstorms in Chicago. The example fits the Demsetz thesis, because
the snow causes the value of parking places to spike, and the recognition of
exclusion rights both creates an incentive to dig out parking places and
minimizes the dissipation of rent associated with searching for available
spaces. After the snow melts, the exclusion norm disappears. As Epstein
recounts, the exclusionary norm applies primarily on secondary streets with
single-family residences, with the understanding that every household has a
claim on one parking place. Thus, the example suggests that property is most
likely to emerge in situations of broad equality and consensus about the
desirable use of resources within a community. This stands in sharp contrast
to the distributional theories, which posit inequality of power and/or wealth
as a necessary condition of creating property.
A final question concerns the symmetry of the thesis. Demsetz was con-
cerned with the paradigmatic situation in which we start with open access
and end up with property. But if the explanation for such shifts is based on
a comparison of costs and benefits, and both benefit and cost functions can
shift in either direction over time, then one would also expect to see move-
ments in the reverse direction. That is, one would expect to find situations
in which benefits fall or costs rise and society moves from a property regime
all or partway back to an open-access regime. Levmore considers the phe-
nomenon of reversibility at length from a theoretical perspective. Haddock
and Kiesling, adopting a more empirical approach, review the evidence about
the impact of the Black Death, which caused a large relative shift in the
values of labor, capital, and land, on property rights. The articles by Banner
and Henry Smith also touch on the possibility of reversibility. A possible
generalization from these papers is that property rights are sticky in the sense
that large up-front costs make it hard to create them, but once created, there
is often little reason to get rid of them even if the benefits decline to the
point where they would not be created de novo.
The articles in this volume are by no means the final word on the Demsetz
thesis. Like all academic work, they probably do less to resolve issues than
to suggest potential avenues for further research.
One area for further research is to develop a clearer specification of what
we mean by property when we discuss the impact of changing resource
values on legal institutions. Economic analysis has long been content with
a very casual understanding of the institution of property.22 This has not
21 Compare Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991)
(developing a theory of property rights on the basis of the norms recognized in close-knit
communities); Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare (1986)
(developing a theory of property based on spontaneously evolved convention).
22 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics? 111 Yale L. J. 357 (2001).
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inhibited progress in understanding things such as tort and contract law, but
it probably has retarded progress in understanding the evolution of property
rights. For example, a clearer specification of what we mean by property
could help in delineating the costs of creating property rights and might
illuminate the question of what causes property rights to emerge (or recede).
Another area of promise is to do more case studies of episodes that run
counter to the central Demsetz paradigm. This would include both episodes
in which resource values rise or fall sharply but institutions do not change
and episodes in which institutions, with or without changes in resource values,
move from private-exclusion rights to communal property rights or open-
access regimes. Further study of these “abnormal” episodes may be the most
promising avenue for developing a more complete understanding of the costs
of creating and maintaining property rights.
Finally, the contributions to this volume suggest that there are two principal
candidates for the causal mechanism that translates changes in resource values
into changes in property institutions: distributional or interest group theories
and consensual social norm theories. It might be possible to test the relative
plausibility of these theories using econometric techniques. As Banner sug-
gests, the distributional theories imply that changes in property rights should
occur more readily in inegalitarian societies. Conversely, norm theory would
seem to suggest that changes in property rights will occur more readily in
relatively close-knit, egalitarian communities. Thus, these theories can per-
haps be tested by developing quantitative measures of social equality and of
rates of change in property institutions and performing appropriate regression
analyses.
A second avenue to arbitrating between interest group and social norm
theories would be to undertake more microsociological studies along the
lines of Epstein’s study of Chicago’s snowstorm/parking norms. Particularly
instructive would be situations in which resources shift in and out of exclusion
rights depending on their scarcity or value. Careful probing of the relevant
sequence of events might reveal whether the adoption of property rights in
these circumstances tends to be imposed from the top down, as the distri-
butional theories would suggest, or tends to be more bottom up or sponta-
neous, as norm theory would suggest. Or such studies might reveal that both
forces are at work or that one or the other tends to predominate depending
on the circumstances.
The articles in this volume are divided into those devoted to theory, which
appear first, and those devoted to empirical studies, which follow. The di-
vision is only approximate, however, as all of the theory pieces include
multiple references to specific examples, and all of the empirical pieces
contain valuable and often original theorizing. Harold Demsetz, who we
honor with this issue, gets pride of place in an afterword. Financial support
for the conference and special issue was generously provided by the Searle
Fund and Northwestern University School of Law.
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